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Abstract
Protecting the location privacy of drivers is still one of the main challenges in Vehicular Ad-hoc Networks (VANETs). The
changing of pseudonym is commonly accepted as a solution to this problem. The pseudonyms represent fake vehicle identiﬁers.
Roadside Units (RSUs) play a central role in the existing pseudonyms distribution solutions. Indeed, the VANET area should
totally be covered by RSUs in order to satisfy the demand of vehicles in terms of pseudonyms. However, the total coverage is
costly and hard to be achieved, especially in the ﬁrst phase of VANETs deployment. In addition, RSUs could be overloaded due to
the large number of pseudonyms requests that could be received from vehicles. In this paper, we propose a new hybrid pseudonyms
distribution method, called HPDM that relies not only on RSUs but also on vehicles to perform the pseudonyms distribution. The
analysis demonstrate that HPDM is privacy and accountability preserving. The performance evaluation of the proposed method is
carried out using veins framework based on OMNet++ network simulator and SUMO mobility engine and shows its feasibility.
c© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.
Peer-review under responsibility of the Conference Program Chairs.
Keywords: VANETs; Security; Location privacy; Pseudonyms distribution.
1. Introduction
Vehicular Ad-hoc networks (VANETs) are considered as a subclass of Mobile Ad-hoc networks (MANETs)1. The
mobile nodes represent the vehicles, which communicate to each other and to ﬁxed infrastructure points, called Road-
side Units (RSUs). Many interesting applications are enabled due to these communications. The existing applications
allow not only to preserve road safety (e.g., emergence reporting and collision warning) but also to provide traﬃc
eﬃciency and entertainment2.
The VANETs are exposed to a variety of attacks that could cause serious damages both on VANET system and
users. Location tracking is one of the attacks that can hinder the deployment of VANETs3. The problem is coming
from the authenticated safety-related messages that are broadcasted with a high frequency and in clear text. Indeed,
several studies demonstrated that a simple passive adversary could collect these messages and relate them according
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to vehicles’ identiﬁers4. The adversary could then generate a movement trajectory of each vehicle to know the
emplacements visited by the driver over time, which violates the driver’s privacy5.
The changing of pseudonym is accepted as solution to this problem. The pseudonyms represent fake vehicle
identiﬁers. The vehicle is equipped by a set of pseudonyms, where each pseudonym is used for a limited period of time.
An expiry pseudonym is changed by a new one and cannot generally be reused again. The current 1609.2 standard is
based on a public key infrastructure (PKI)6. The pseudonyms are public keys certiﬁed by the trusted authority (TA)
and generated using one of the following methods7. (i) They could be generated by vehicles themselves, sent to TA
to be signed and sent back to vehicles through RSUs, (ii) They could be generated by RSUs instead of vehicles, sent
to TA to be signed, and then distributed by RSUs to the vehicles, (iii) They could be generated by a third party, sent to
TA to be signed, and distributed by RSUs, and ﬁnally (iv) They could generated and singed by TA, and distributed to
vehicles by RSUs. In addition, due to the accountability (liability) issues only the TA can still know the link between
the real identiﬁer of a vehicle and the set of pseudonyms associated to it.
In8, Raya and al. estimated the number of pseudonyms needed by a vehicle. They suggested to provide about
43,800 pseudonyms per year for a vehicle that is used 2 hours, in average, per day and changes its pseudonym every
1 minute. However, the number of needed pseudonyms mainly depends the frequency of pseudonym changing and
the use of vehicle. Obviously, the more pseudonym changing frequency is, the more location privacy protection is
achieved. This is on condition that pseudonym chaining frequency is not less then a certain threshold9. Therefore,
a huge number of pseudonyms should be stored by vehicles, which can exceed vehicle storage capabilities. For
this reason, the existing solutions suggested that pseudonyms should be requested according to the vehicle demand.
Indeed, the RSUs play a central role in these solution because they are not only used to request the pseudonyms but also
to distribute them. These solutions assume that the VANET area is already covered by RSUs. This assumption might
generate a high deployment costs and it is hard to be achieved, especially in the ﬁrst phase of the VANET deployment.
In addition, the RSUs could be overloaded due to frequent pseudonyms requests and distributions operations.
To address these limitations, in this paper, we propose a new hybrid pseudonyms distribution method, called
HPDM. HPDM is based not only on RSUs but also on vehicles to distribute the pseudonyms. It aims to involve
vehicles in the pseudonyms distribution to ensure the availability of pseudonyms (e.g. in the case of luck in the
number of deployed RSUs) and to reduce the overload on RSUs. The analysis demonstrated that proposed method
is privacy and accountability preserving. The performance evaluation is carried out using veins framework based on
OMNet++ network simulator and SUMOmobility engine. The simulation results show the feasibility of the proposed
method.
Our contribution is then threefold:
• We propose a new pseudonym pseudonyms distribution method, called HPDM that is based both on vehicles
and RSUs.
• We suggest to integrate HPDM with Urban Pseudonym Changing Strategy (UPCS)10 11.
• We evaluate the performance of HPDM using veins framework based on OMNet++ network simulator and
SUMO mobility engine.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes some related work. The proposed method
(HPDM) is presented in Section 3. HPDM analysis are given in Section 4 and performance evaluations are presented
in Section 5. The conclusion is given in Section 6.
2. Related work
In12, the authors investigated the optimal strategy for reﬁlling pseudonyms. Two pseudonyms reﬁll strategies
were then identiﬁed : reﬁlling a large number of pseudonyms at one time (strategy 1) or reﬁlling a small number
of pseudonyms several times (strategy 2). After citing the beneﬁts and the drawbacks of each strategy, the authors
concluded that the strategy 2 has more beneﬁts than the strategy 1. For this reason, they proposed a new pseudonym
reﬁll solution called pseudonym-on-demand (POD). POD is based on the strategy 1, where vehicles send their requests
to the pseudonym provider (PP) through RSUs when they need new pseudonyms. However, as mentioned by the
authors themselves the strategy 1 has a high cost of deployment. In7, the authors evaluated the amount of data that
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can be acquired by a vehicle during a single pass of a RSU using NS3 simulator. The purpose is to determine whether a
single pass over a RSU is enough to a vehicle to get the number of needed pseudonyms. The authors found the amount
of data that can be downloaded from the RSU is depended on several parameters such as the speed of the vehicle,
the distance between the vehicle and the RSU, and the traﬃc density. They then concluded that vehicles need several
contacts with RSUs to satisfy their demand of pseudonyms. For this reason, they proposed Pseudonym distribution
Protocol (PNDP) that allows to RSUs to collaborate for distributing the totality of pseudonyms needed by vehicles.13
noted that RSUs can be overloaded due to the large number of vehicles’ requests. The authors in14 pointed out the
performance impacts that can be created due to pseudonyms reﬁll operations. They then aimed to free up the networks
from the unneeded reﬁll operations. For this reason, they investigated the preferred moment to vehicles to request for
a pseudonym. They compared three techniques.(i) The baseline technique, where a vehicle requests for pseudonym
whenever it meets an RSU, (ii) the threshold technique, where a vehicle requests for pseudonyms only if it has less
than a certain threshold, and (iii) the probabilistic technique, where a vehicle requests for pseudonyms as function
as the number of pseudonyms that it stores. In15, the authors considered the pseudonyms as costly resources. As a
consequence, they proposed to view the pseudonym as a service i.e. instead of providing pseudonyms pro-actively
to all vehicles, the pseudonyms are only provided to the vehicles that requested them. In addition, they developed a
stochastic model to estimate the number of pseudonyms needed by vehicles. In10 11, the authors developped a new
pseudonym changing strategy called UPCS based on the creation of silence mix zones at signalized intersection.
Simulation results showed that a level of location privacy protection can be achieved using this strategy.
3. HPDM Description
3.1. VANET System Model
We consider that the VANET system is composed of vehicles and Road-Side Units (RSUs). Each vehicle has
an On-Board Unit (OBU) device that is equipped with a wireless technology based on the IEEE 802.11p/WAVE
standard. The OBU allows the vehicle not only to communicate with other vehicles but also with RSUs. Each vehicle
is also equipped with a GPS receiver that allows obtaining the position and the current time. Each vehicle periodically
broadcasts a safety message every t milliseconds, where each message includes information about the vehicle such as
its position and its speed. We also assume the existence of a trusted authority (TA) that provides public and private
keys to vehicles and RSUs. TA has a communication link with all roadside units. The TA is responsible for the
generation and management of pseudonyms used by vehicles.
3.2. System Initialization
Before joining the VANET, each vehicle registers with the TAwith its vehicle identiﬁer IDv. During the registration,
each vehicle Vi is equipped with a public and a private keys and Qv sets of pseudonyms. Qv is the maximum number
of pseudonyms sets that can be stored by the vehicle. Each set contains n pseudonyms Kj,k where k ∈ 1,..., n. The
pseudonyms are public keys certiﬁed by the TA. For each pseudonym Kj,k of vehicle Vi, the TA provides a certiﬁcate
Cert j,k(K j,k). The private key K−1j,k corresponding to the pseudonym Kj,k is used by the vehicle Vi to digitally sign
messages. The pseudonym is attached to each message to enable other vehicles an RSUs to verify the sender’s
authenticity. Each pseudonyms set is identiﬁed by a unique identiﬁer (IDps). Due to accountability issues, the TA
stores the details of each issued pseudonyms set such as its identiﬁer and its owner on a table. In the initialization
phase TA also identiﬁes the vehicles that will be used to carry out the pseudonyms sets distribution. These vehicles
are called the Pseudonym Provider Vehicles (PPVs). The list of all PPVs is also stored by the TA.
Typically, the PPVs are chosen from the vehicles that are frequently used to travel for long distances. This is
basically depends on the nature of the vehicle such as (.e.g, buses, cars, and trucks) and the behaviour of the driver.
We will investigate more the strategies on the choose the PPVs in our future works.
After installing RSUs, TA provides to each RSU a couple of certiﬁcated keys consisting of a public key with an
associated certiﬁcate CertRSU and a private key for digitally sign the broadcasted messages and a symmetric key PRSU
to encrypt communication between the TA and the RSU. The RSU has a pseudonyms pool that supports only QRSU
sets of pseudonyms. The TA generates and sendsQRSU encrypted sets of pseudonyms with their corresponding private
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keys. The RSU contacts the TA each time it needs new sets of pseudonyms. The TA temporary assigns the RSU as
the owner of each delivered pseudonyms set. In order to check the validity of the public key certiﬁcates, the TA also
provides for each RSU and for each vehicle its own public key PCA.
3.3. Pseudonyms Distribution
In contrast of the existing pseudonyms distribution solutions, which are only based on RSUs, HPDM relies both on
vehicles and RSUs to carry out the pseudonyms distribution. The HPDMmethod consists thus of two protocols: RSU-
based pseudonyms distribution protocol and Vehicle-based pseudonyms distribution protocols. These two protocols
are presented in following subsections.
3.3.1. RSU-based Pseudonyms Distribution Protocol
The RSU periodically broadcasts a notiﬁcation (Notifpds) to announce the availability of pseudonyms distribution
service. These notiﬁcations are authenticated and the RSU’s public key certiﬁcate (CertRSU) is attached to every
notiﬁcation. When a vehicle receives such notiﬁcation, it contacts the RSU only if one or more of these conditions
are met :
1. If the number of pseudonyms sets stored by the vehicle is less or equal than a certain threshold C1, the vehicle
then requests for new pseudonyms sets. This authenticated request includes the vehicle identiﬁer (IDv), and
is encrypted by the RSU public key. As soon as the RSU receives the request, it starts delivering the set of
pseudonyms to the vehicle. The delivery messages are encrypted using the current pseudonyms of the vehicle.
The vehicle should send an acknowledgment each time it receives a complete pseudonyms set. In addition, to
keep the system updated, the RSU sends to the TA an information about each delivered pseudonyms set and
the vehicle that obtained that set. After receiving these information, the TA then updates the pseudonyms sets’
owners in its table. Algorithm 1 describes the pseudo-code of the RSU-based pseudonyms distribution protocol.
Algorithm 1 RSU-based Pseudonyms Distribution
RSU periodically broadcasts a notiﬁcation (Notifpds)
if (vehicle.notif received = true) then
if (vehicle.pseudossets number)≤ C1 then
Vehicle sends a request to the RSU for new pseudonyms sets
if rsu.request received = true then
RSU sends an encrypted pseudonyms set to the vehicle
while (rsu.acknowledgment = true) do
RSU sends an encrypted pseudonyms set to the vehicle
end while
end if
end if
end if
2. If the vehicle is a Pseudonym Provider Vehicle (PPV) and has already distributed pseudonyms sets but it did not
inform the TA about them yet. Then, the vehicle sends a message to the RSU that includes its identiﬁer and the
information about each distributed pseudonyms set such as its identiﬁer IDps, the identiﬁer of the new owner
of the pseudonyms set, and the time when the distribution occurs. The identiﬁer of the owner represents the
pseudonym that is used to contact the PPV. The message is then authenticated and encrypted using the RSU’s
public key, and will immediately be transferred to the TA as soon as the RSU receives it. After the that, the
RSU sends an acknowledgment encrypted by the current pseudonym of the PPV. The TA uses the information
included in the message to update its table that keeps the detail of each distributed pseudonyms set. Algorithm 2
describes the pseudo-code that describes this process.
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Algorithm 2 Updating The Information about the distributed PS
RSU periodically broadcasts a notiﬁcation (Notifpds)
if (vehicle.notif received = true) then
if (vehicle.IamPPV= true) and (vehicle.PS distributed=true) then
Vehicle sends a message that includes the detail of each performed distributed PS
if rsu.received message = true then
RSU transfers the received message to the TA.
RSU sends an acknowledgement to the PPV
end if
end if
end if
3.3.2. Vehicle-based Pseudonyms Distribution Protocol
Algorithm 3 describes the pseudo code of vehicle-based pseudonyms distribution protocol. The pseudonym
provider vehicle (PPV) starts the distribution process only if the number of pseudonyms sets that possesses is grater
or equal than a certain threshold C2. If the condition meet, the PPV starts broadcasting notiﬁcations to announce the
availability of pseudonyms distribution service. If a neighboring vehicle receives such notiﬁcation, it checks if the
number of remaining pseudonyms sets is less or equal than a threshold C1. If this is the case, the vehicle then requests
for new pseudonyms sets. The authenticated request is encrypted by the current pseudonym of the provider vehicle.
As soon as the PPV receives the request, it starts delivering pseudonyms sets to the vehicle. The delivery messages
are encrypted using the current pseudonyms of the vehicle. The vehicle should send an acknowledgment each time
it receives a complete pseudonyms set. This acknowledgment is encrypted using the current PPV pseudonym. After
receiving the acknowledgment, the PPV deletes the distributed pseudonym set and should only store the detail of each
performed pseudonyms set distribution such as the identiﬁer (pseudonym) of the new owner of the pseudonym and
the time of the distribution. These information will be sent to the TA as soon as the PPV has a contact with a RSU as
described in Subsection 3.3.1.
Algorithm 3 Vehicle-Based Pseudonyms Distribution
if (PPV.pseudossets number)≥ C2 then
The the PPV periodically broadcasts a notiﬁcation (Notifpds)
if (vehicle.notif received = true) and (vehicle.pseudossets number)≤ C1 then
Vehicle sends a request to the provider vehicle for new pseudonyms sets
if PPV.request received = true then
The PPV sends a pseudonyms set to the vehicle
while (PPV.acknowledgment = true) and (PPV.pseudossets number)≥ C2 do
The PPV sends a pseudonyms set to the vehicle
end while
end if
end if
end if
3.4. Integration of HPDM with UPCS
In10,11, a new pseudonym changing strategy, called Urban Pseudonym Changing Strategy is proposed. UPCS
aims to achieve a high level of location privacy protection using the pseudonym changing approach. It uses an RSU
installed at a signalized intersection for creating a silent mix zone while the traﬃc light is red. The analysis and
performances evaluation show that UPCS allows to avoid the pseudonyms linking attacks and provides a high level
of entropy values. Besides of this, UPCS allows to reduce the radio channel load. For this reason and for the reason
that a vehicle may still waiting in front of the red traﬃc light for a period of time between 30s et 60s, we suggest to
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integrate UPCS with HPDM. Indeed, the low radio channel load and the long period of contact between the RSU and
the vehicle, will deﬁnitely help the vehicles to increase the number of pseudonyms sets loaded from the RSU.
4. HPDM Analysis
In this section we analyze HPDM in terms of the accountability and the privacy preserving. The accountability
is an important security requirement in VANETs because the misbehaving nodes should be identiﬁed and excluded
from the system. In the pseudonymous schemes, the authorities should be able to resolve the link between the real
identiﬁer of a vehicle and its pseudonym. In HPDM, the accountability is preserved at diﬀerent levels: (i) During
the initialization phase, the TA stores the information about the owner each provided pseudonyms set, (ii) The TA
also temporally assigns the RSU as an owner of the pseudonyms sets that not distributed yet to the vehicles (iii) If
the RSU distributes a pseudonyms set, it sends the identiﬁer of the new owner of the pseudonyms set to the TA.
The TA will then update the information about the owner of the pseudonyms set stored in its table, an ﬁnally (iv) As
distributed in 3.3.1, the pseudonym provider vehicle (PPV), regularly sends a message that contains information about
the distributed pseudonyms sets to the RSU. This message includes the pseudonym of new owner of each pseudonyms
set. When the TA receives such message, it ﬁrst resolves the pseudonym to ﬁnd the real identity of the vehicle. After
that, it updates the information about the distributed pseudonyms set.
In the other hand, HPDM is privacy preserving, because the all information exchanged between a vehicle and the
RSU and between a PPV and a vehicle are encrypted. In addition, all the pseudonym provider vehicles (PPVs) are
monitored by the TA and each distributed pseudonyms set is deleted from the PPVs.
5. HPDM Performances Evaluation
To study the feasibility and to evaluate the performances of the proposed method, we performed a set of simula-
tions. These simulations are conducted using Veins Simulation Framework16. Veins is an inter-vehicular commu-
nication simulation framework based on OMNet++ bi-directionally coupled with SUMO road traﬃc simulation17.
OMNET++ and SUMO run in parallel and communicate via a TCP socket. The reason of choosing Veins is its abil-
ity to simulation full 802.11p and IEEE 1609.4 DSRC/WAVE network layers. Table 1 summarizes the parameters
considered in our simulation.
Table 1. Simulation Parameters
Parameter Value
Simulation duration 30 min
Transmission Range 500 m
Traﬃc density 20, 40, 60, and 80(vehicles/km2)
Qv 6
The number of pseudonyms in each set 10
The frequency of changing of the pseudonym 30 s
Notifpds frequency 1 s
C1 2
C2 4
In the considered scenario, we have modeled the Manhattan city in Grid of 2km x 2km, three horizontal two-
way streets and three vertical two-way streets, with two lanes in each direction, crossed each 1km. The vehicles were
generated using SUMO to take trips of 30 min duration. The number of pseudonyms sets that is stored by each vehicle
0 http://www.omnetpp.org
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is randomly selected for the range [C1 , Qv]. In our evaluation, we run simulations by changing the traﬃc density
parameter each time, from the low traﬃc density (20 vehicles/km2) to the high traﬃc density (80 vehicles/km2).
20 km^2 40 v/km^2 60 v/km^2 80 v/km^2
Traffic Density
 
Th
e 
N
um
be
r 
of
 p
se
ud
on
ym
s 
di
st
ri
bu
te
d 
by
 th
e 
R
S
U
0
20
0
40
0
60
0
80
0
10
00
14
00 HPDM (10%)
BASELINE
(a) Comparison between HPDM and the Baseline method in
terms of the number of obtained pseudonyms sets from RSU.
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Fig. 1. The number of the obtained pseudonyms set versus the traﬃc density (The percentage of of PPv in HPDM equals 10%.)
We ﬁrst compare HPD Method with the baseline method. We consider that the percentage of the pseudonym
provider vehicles (PPVs) equals only 10%. The baseline distribution method is only based on the RSU. In this
method, the vehicles simply request for new pseudonyms if the number of stored pseudonyms sets is less or equal
than the threshold C1.
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Fig. 2. The number of pseudonyms sets obtained from both of the PPVs versus the percentage of PPVs (Traﬃc density =60 (veh/km2))
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Figure 1 (a) compares between the number of pseudonyms sets distributed by the RSU in each method versus the
traﬃc density. We can observe that using HPDM, the number of obtained pseudonyms sets from RSUs are reduced
whatever the traﬃc density is. For example, the number of pseudonyms sets distributed by the RSUs is decreased for
more than 20% in case of traﬃc density equals to 20 veh/km2. Figure 1(b) compares the number the pseudonyms
sets received from the RSU with the number of pseudonyms sets received from PPVs in HPDM. We can see that an
important number (more than 35%) of pseudonyms sets are obtained from PPVs, which reﬂects the role played by
these vehicles in the pseudonyms sets distribution.
In Figure 2, we evaluate the number of pseudonyms sets obtained both from the RSU end the PPVs as function
as the percentage of PPVs. We set traﬃc density to 60 (veh/km2). Figure 2 shows that the number of obtained
pseudonyms from the RSU decreases with the increase of the percentage of PPVs. It also shows the number of
pseudonyms sets obtained from the PPVs increases with the percentage of PPVs. Indeed more that than 50% of
pseudonyms sets are obtained from PPVs when the percentage of PPVs only equals to 20%.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed a Hybrid Pseudonym distribution Method (HPDM) that is based not only on RSUs
but also on vehicles to perform the distribution of pseudonyms. We carried out a set of simulation to evaluate the
performance of the proposed method using veins framework. The obtained results demonstrated the feasibility of the
proposed method. As future works, we will investigate the choosing the pseudonym provider vehicles (PPVs) and
carry out extensive simulations.
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